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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~1AH DEPARTMENT OF 
IRl'.l'ISF• JR I AT I ml, 
Respondent, 
'/S. 
J0Hll D'AMBROSIO, MABLE 
U'AMBROSIO, his wife, 
JOSEPH CHA and MARION 
CHA, his wife, 
Appellants. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
19271 
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court, 
"f.R," refers to Transcript of Record, "R." refers to Record, and 
"Ex." refers to Exhibit. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter involves two eminent domain cases which were 
consolidated for trial and involving parcels of real property 
situate in Carbon County, State of Utah. The jurisdictional 
issues relative to the right of the Plaintiff to condemn were not 
contested, and the matters proceeded for trial based upon the 
statutory issue of just compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter came on for trial before the Court with a jury 
,,n thP 0,th day of April, 1983, before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, 
Gcslr let Court Judge, which trial was scheduled following a series 
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of hearings and rulings on various Motions. 
Based upon prior rulings of the trial rourt, 
posture of the pleadings, the parties entered uilu 
'I 
the commencement of the trial to settle the issue of ,J,,,,,,J, 
the value of the parcel "taken in fee", (Parcel 69:A), b1J': 
as an issue on appeal, the Court's Orders and rulings •c1livc J· 
the defendant landowners to seek a determination of severarn 
damages sustained by their respective remaining tracts b; Jur·. 
trial. (R. 61-64, 74-75, 107-108, 110-111, 126; T.R. 76-52 
Pursuant to said Stipulation, Judgment was enterFa fee· 
value of the land taken, (R. 121-123), and the defendant landci.:· 
thereafter instituted this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that the Orders and rulings of the tr 
court, denying them from asserting their claims for severance 
damages, be reversed and that the matter be remanded for JUG 
on said issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation, 
instituted five ( 5) separate actions in the District Court nf 
Carbon County, Utah, Civil Nos. 11211, 11212, 11213, 11214, 
11215, pertaining to various parcels of land located in tloe 
southeast quadrant of Price, Utah, and generally referred tc 
the "D'Ambrosio properties". (R. 1 , 39.-46; T. R. 
The purpose of such actions was to acquire lancJs i " 1 
construction and maintenance of a new bypass highway f~c:dili 
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1 l111~t r'11cted in and near Price, Utah. (R. 1, 39-46; T.R. 3-7; 
[ ' [J- l ) . 
Common to each case was a small strip of land which 
'"'"r ttuLed a private access and right-of-way leading to and from 
'" r •0 Spective parcels of the various defendant landowners to the 
publlc highway located northerly therefrom, and which was condemned 
u'} the> Plaintiff as part of the lands being acquired for highway 
j~velopment. This particular parcel is identified throughout the 
?ar1uus cases as "Parcel No. 028-2:69:A", and sometimes referred to 
as "Parcel 69:A", comprising approximately 0.10 acres, more or 
less. ( R. 74-75; Ex. D-1). 
By Order of the trial court, Civil Actions 11213 and 11214 
,1ere consolidated for trial, (R. 74-75), and it is these cases 
~h1ch are the subJect of this appeal. The trial court ruled that 
tl1e defendant landowners, John D'Ambrosio, Mable D'Ambrosio, his 
•1fe, Joseph Cha, and Marion Cha, his wife, were not, as a matter 
of law, entitled to assert a claim for severance damages to their 
respective private residential premises. (R. 61-64, 74-75, 107-
!U8, 110-111; T.R. 55-57). 
It is this ruling and Order that the Defendants object to 
3nd ask that this Court reverse same, and order a trial on the 
issue of severance damages. 
The parcel of land which forms the focal point of this 
3ppea 1 , (Pa reel 69: A) , is but a part of a total tract which has 
historically been owned, used, and occupied by the "D'Ambrosio 
fornily" of Price, Utah, as a private right-of-way and access to 
"f1Ptr respective tracts of land. (R. 1-9, 36-46, 52-57, 65-69, 
80-'J8; Ex. D-1) 
.,.. 
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It is generally undisputed and acknowledged, as evid"r. 
by the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, that John D'Amh~: 
and Mable D'Ambrosia, husband and wife, own and occupy 
residential lot upon which they have constructed their fa~ •. 
residence, located at the most southerly end of "Parcel 69:r," 
contiguous to the easterly line of said parcel, and that Sd\e 
"Parcel 69 :A" has been and does in fact constitute the sole 
established access from the public highway leading to their r_,,_ 
fronting on said "Parcel 69:A". ( R. 1-9' 36-46' 52-57' 65-~: 
The Defendants Joseph Cha and Marion Cha are husban<J ,,., I 
wife, and own in fee simple a private residential lot adiacer.t · 
the north boundary of the residential lot owned and occupied r 
John D'Ambrosia and Mable D'Ambrosia, his wife, upon which the" 
has been constructed their family residence, and which 11kew1~ 
fronts on and is contiguous to the east line of "Parcel 69:A", 
which parcel affords the sole and only established access le~· 
from their home to the public highway located northerly therefc · 
Marion Cha and John D 'Ambrosio are brother and sister, 
with the exception of their spouses, the other named Defend•~' 
Civil Actions, Nos. 11213 and 11214, are children of a deceased 
brother of the Defendants John D 'Ambrosio and Marion Cha. The 
other named Defendants owned an additional residential tract 
contiguous to and immediately north of the Cha property, v1h1 cl 
1 ikewi se fronted upon "Paree 1 69: A" , al though the northerly l''i· 
that parcel was contiguous to a county road running in an ease 
direction. This particular parcel, however, was acquired l•Y 
Plaintiff in separate condemnation proceedings for highway 
construction and development. 
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The subiect property (Parcel 69:A) had for more than 25 
r ''"-'nty-f1ve) years been utilized by the Defendants and the 
''U'Ambros10 family'' as a right-of-way for ingress and egress to the 
f'i'I r r,0 Ls of 1 and which each of the parties own. 
'o2-':;7, 6'i-69, 80-98) 
(R. 1-9, 36-46, 
Based upon an examination of the title thereto, the 
nvmership of "Parcel 69:A" was, at the date of condemnation, vested 
1n fee simple as follows: 88.92% undivided interest in John 
D'Ambrosia; 11.08% undivided interest or 2.77% each by Domenic 
U'Ambrosio, Paul D'Ambrosia, Sharon D'Ambrosia, and Frances 
D'Ambrosia; subject, however, to an easement and right-of-way in 
favor of all of the named Defendants for ingress and egress to 
their respective properties. (R. 80-98). 
In Civil Actions, Nos. 11213 and 11214, the Plaintiff 
recognizes and alleges the Defendants are either "record owners" or 
"parties in interest" of "Parcel 69 :A", (R. 80-98) 
, and does not dispute the fact that the "Parcel 69:A" 
constituted the established method and source of ingress and egress 
to the resepctive parcels of land belonging to the Defendants over 
a long period of time. (R. 1-9, 23, 39-42) 
Based upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Plaintiff, the Court, by Order on August 31, 1981, ruled that the 
Defendants, Joseph Cha and Marion Cha, his wife, and John D'Ambrosia 
anrl Mable D'Ambrosia, his wife, were not entitled to any 
compensation for severance damages to their respective residential 
p1operties owned in fee simple, as any such damages would be 
•consequential in nature, and therefore, not subject to compensation. 
IH 'JO-'il, 74-75) 
-6-
Upon further hearing and argument, the Court reaff;,,. 
prior ruling by Order dated November 3, 1981, there1n ~Gnc·J 
and ordering that said Defendants were not ent1tled to 
severance damages, notwithstanding the fact that tiH· 
fractional interests or established rights-of-way ~1th 
that the Court accepted factually the conditions of ovmer~r 
asserted by the Defendants John D'Ambrosio and Mable D'Amhi•,• 
(R. 107-108). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS IBLE ERROR IN RULlliC · 
THE DEFENDANTS JOHN D 'AMBROSIO, AND MABL£D'AMBROSICJ;'-ITT~ 
JOSEPH CHA AND MARION CHA, HIS WIFE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, ARE 
PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES rn IITT: 
RESPECTIVE PRIVATELY OWNED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
The subject actions involve the condemnation and 
expropriation of a private and exclusive right-of-way ovmej / 
used in common by the Defendants, which constituted the estat.:· 
and exclusive access from their respective residences to the 
highway located northerly therefrom. (R. 1-9; Ex. D-1) 
The critical issues here presented are: 
1. Does the taking of a private easement or right 01 • 
constitute a "taking" in the constitutional and statutory sci•· 
and, 
2. Whether damages accrue to the portion of the pr·Jc' 
remaining after the portion condemned has been taken. 
It is clear under the Eminent Domain statutes 
that a private easement or right-of-way, as well as. fee 
-7-
1,1 '1'1 111av be taken for a public use under appropriate circumstances. 
11tle §78-34-2, U.C.A., (1953 as amended). 
ritle §78-34-10, U.C.A., (1953 as amended), provides, in 
tl1at in determining the amount of compensation and damages to 
1ded in an eminent domain proceeding, the Court or jury must 
, " , !:cc legal evidence and ascertain and assess: 
* *(l) The value of the property sought to be 
rondemned and all improvements thereon appertaining 
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate 
or interest therein; and if it consists of different 
parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate 
or interest therein shall be separately assessed." 
"(2) If the property sought to be condemned con-
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned and the construction 
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the 
Plaintiff. * * -1i: 11 
On the issue of whether or not a private easement or right-
of-VJay constitutes such an estate in property as to give rise to a 
r:aim for damages when taken in eminent domain proceedings, it has 
generally been recognized that such an estate in real estate does 
in fact constitute a "property interest" in the constitutional 
sense and must be compensated for when taken under the exercise of 
eminent domain. 
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 2, 
Section 5.14, it is stated: 
"It is well settled that a private easement in real 
estate is property in the constitutional sense, and 
may be taken via exercise of the power of eminent 
domain. * * * An easement is an interest in land, 
and it is taken in the constitutional sense when 
the land over which it is exercised is taken; * * *" 
"vvhen the servient tenement is the subject of a 
rondemnation proceeding judicial in character it 
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has been held that the owner of the dominant 
tenement is a necessary party. * -r, -,', ,, 
See: STATE OF ARIZONA v. THELBERG, 350 P.2d 988, (Ariz. 1·r 
STATE OF ARIZONA v. WILSON, 420 P.2d 992, (Ariz. l'lhhi, 
BRINTON, 41 Idaho 317; 239 P. 738. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Defer··.·· 
John D'Ambrosia and Mable D'Ambrosia not only utilized the 5 ,~c 
"Parcel 69:A" as a right-of-way, but were in fact the owners 
simple of 88. 92%, subject, however, to the rights of the othec 
Defendants as users thereof as an easement and right-of -v1ay ': 
their respective properties and that such right-of-way v1as p•r, 
in nature. (R. 1-9, 80-98) 
This Court has consistently held that owners of prope·· 
which abutt an established public street and have an easement 
access thereto are entitled to be compensated when such acces•. 
substantially impaired or destroyed through the exercise of" 
domain power. See: DOOLY BLOCK v. SALT LAKE RAPID TRANSIT Cr. 
9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229; STATE ROAD COMMISSION v. ROSELLE, 101 
464; 120 P.2d 276; STATE ROAD COMMISSION v. HANSEN, 14 Utah'' 
383 P.2d 917; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volur•. 
Section 6.36. 
In the case of City of Lewis ton v. Brinton, supra, a 
similar fact situation was involved, and the Supreme Court of· 
held: 
"Whether the rights of the easement owners were 
interfered with or impaired in any manner v1as a 
question of fact only determinable if they were 
parties, furthermore, under C. S. §7414, it rnust_ 
be determined whether damages accrue to the 
portion of the property remaining to the owner 
after the portion condemned has been taken. 
Appellant herein owned buildings adjacent to the 
proposed alley, and consequently, if the tenants 
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were affected by the change in the thoroughfare, 
he would be affected, and, furthermore, those who 
claimed easements might be vitally affected by 
the changed use resulting from the establishment 
of the proposed alley. These easement claimants 
should therefore have been made parties. c. s. 
§ 7 410. '' '' *" (Emphasis added) 
"'' '' ''in view of C. S. §7414, the jury should have 
been instructed on damages which might accrue to 
the remaining portion of appellant's property not 
sought to be condemned. * * *" (Emphasis added) 
It has generally been recognized that when property has 
heen injuriously affected or has sustained a special or peculiar 
dArnage as a result of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
compensation is required especially where there has been some 
physical disturbance of a right which an owner of his parcel of 
land has enjoyed in connection with his property which gives it 
additional value. See: Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 
Volume 2, Section 6.27 (3); BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LOGAN CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT v. CROFT, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697; CUTLER v. CITY OF 
BOSTON, 86 N.E. 798; WEBSTER v. CITY OF LOWELL, 8 N.E. 54; STATE 
ex Rel. STATE HIGHWAY v. ZAHN, 633 S.W.2d 185; WILSON v. KANSAS 
CITY, 162 S.W.2d 803. 
The ownership of "Parcel 69:A", and the ownership of the 
respective, individually owned residential tracts, bear a 
relationship to one another, which even though not in common 
ownership in the same quantity, nevertheless sustains the defendant 
landowners' claim to severance damages by reason of the taking of 
the easement servicing the individually owned properties. 
It has generally been recognized by the weight of authority 
that severance damages are generally allowed where there is a unity 
ot title between two tracts, even though the quantity or quality of 
the title or estate in the tracts differ. See: ex Rel. SYMMS v. 
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NELSON SAND AND GRAVEL, I NC. , 468 P. 2d 306; CITY OF LOS Ai!!;E'.c 
WOLFE, 491 P.2d 813; HEMMERLING v. TOMLEU, INC., 4)2 P.2d ,, 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, Sc•·t 101 
In the Symms case, supra, the Court noted: 
"'' '' accordingly, ·we chose to full 
line of authority which allows severance rlArnA1 
where there is unity of title between two tra••,, 
even though the quantity or quality of the ti"lP 
or estate in the two tracts differ. -
In the case of BOXBERGER v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISST, I' 
P.2d 920, (Colo. 1953), the State Highway Commission conde"'''" 
private access, and in addressing the issue of severance ·J""• _ 
be awarded in that case, the Supreme Court of Colorado n0te·i 
"* * *It would seem difficult to establish the 
true or market value of access rights since they 
are not a commodity dealt in on a buying and 
selling market; however, the right of ingress and 
egress to and from a person's property adds or 
detracts from the property value and it would 
seem that the true value of such rights could 
only be found in the difference between the value 
of the land and its use for any and all kinds of 
purposes before the disturbance or destruction of 
such rights, and the value of the land minus any 
access or disturbed or inconvenient access to the 
highway. * * ''" 
Where the parcel actually condemned in this case 
constituted a private right-of-way which afforded the means 
ingress and egress to the individually owned residential 
is our contention that even though the landowners did not 
possess the entire fee simple estate in said right-of-wa;, 
nevertheless, was such an integral part of their respect1~ · 
as to constitute each a separate and total unit. The test •: 
applied in determining whether or not there exists a s1nal 
land, seems to be the requirement that there be such rt 
or relation of adaptation, convenience, and use as to mJkf 
rd 
-11-
rondemned tract reasonable and substantially necessary to the 
·111c•yment of the remaining parcel or parcels. CITY OF STOCKTON v. 
1.1f,P/\ll<~, 31 P.2d 467. 
In 29(A) C.J.S., Section 140, Page 591, it is there stated: 
",., *There is no single rule or principle 
established for determining the unity of lands 
for the purpose of awarding damages in eminent 
domain cases. While, generally, there must be 
unity of title, contiguity of use, and unity of 
use, under certain circumstances, the presence 
of unities is not essential unless unity of use 
is given greatest emphasis, it has been called 
the controlling and determining factor. It has 
been said that in order to constitute a unity of 
property within the rule, there must be such a 
connection or relationship of adaptation, 
convenience, and actual and permanent use as to 
make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably 
and substantially necessary to the enjoyment of 
the parcels left, in the most advantageous and 
profitable manner in the business for which they 
are used. * * *" 
In the case of STATE OF UTAH, by and through its road 
comm1ss1on, v. HOOPER, 469 P.2d 1019, 25 Utah 2d 249, a similar 
case was presented. In that action, the defendant landowner owned 
a strip of land 1630 ft. long by 33 ft. in width, upon which it had 
constructed a canal and service roadway. The condemning authority 
constructed a freeway over and across a portion of the strip of 
land aforesaid, and in so doing, effectively destroyed it for 
vehicular traffic. 
In that case, as in the instant case, the trial court 
failed to award or recognize the existence of severance damages, 
and the Supreme Court held that such ruling of the trial court was 
rev~rs1ble error and remanded the case for a determination on the 
~mount of severance damages to be awarded. 
Another case which we believe to be highly probative of the 
issue herein, is that of BABINEC v. STATE, 512 P.2d 563, (Alaska 
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1973) . In that case, the ownership of the lands afferted 0,1 ,, 
condemnation consisted of an ownership in fee s1mplP, toju··• 
with a leasehold interest, and thP Supreme C0urt nf A 1 ''·v·, 
addressing itself to the issuP Gf severance damrlgP-, 
"(1,2) Turning first to the question of sever-iroc 
damages, a property owner is entitled to such 
damages if it is determinPd that the property 
taken is part of a larger parcel which has be0n 
adversely affected by the taking. The principol 
test utilized for defining the "larger parcel" for 
severance damage purposes is often ref erred to as 
the "three unities" theory. According to this 
doctrine, three factors are employed in 
ascertaining whether property in which the takP 
occurs constitutes a single larger parcel. ThP 
factors are: physical contiguity between the 
several parcels, unity of ownership, and unity~! 
use. Where the various units of property are 
physically contiguous with others, owned by the 
same party or parties, and used for the same 
purpose, the property is said to comprise one 
single parcel of land." 
" ( 3) While the "three uni ties" theory is helpf1;l 
in ascertaining the "larger parcel" to be 
considered for severance damage controlling, we 
do not hold that the theory is controlling. If 
competent evidence is presented indicating that 
by reason of condemnation of a portion of his 
property, remaining property owned by the propert\ 
owner is diminished in value, the issue of 
severance damages should be presented to the 
jury, regardless of whether slavish adherence to 
the "three unities" theory might lead to a 
contrary result. In the case at bar the parties 
had no substantial argument with reference to the 
entire 65-acre Babinec ownership constituting one 
"larger parcel" for the purpose of ascertaining 
severance damages. •'• '' '') 
CONCLUSION 
The two parcels of land here involved, constitute 
individual residential lots upon which the respective Defrn·i•· 
reside v1ith each lot having, as an integral part thereof,•"'' 
established private right-of-way and access extending nort~' 
the public highway system. It is this private access and n0:' 
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,,,,,'/ that has been condemned and taken in fee by the Plaintiff, and 
rl1t>rcby gives rise to the claim and contention on the part of the 
sa•rl landowners that their remaining tracts have sustained 
-~v~r~nce damages. 
we believe that the authorities cited above adequately 
sustain the defendant landowners claim that their respective, 
individual residential homes, together with the right-of-way 
extending to the highway system, constituted a single integral unit 
of property and that when the access of said property was taken and 
condemned for highway development, the remaining tracts sustained 
a diminution in value and that a jury question was presented 
relative to the amount of severance damages sustained by the 
respective landowners. 
It is, therefore, their claim and contention that when the 
trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that severance damages 
could not be awarded under the circumstances here involved, such 
ruling deprived the respective landowners of the right to assert 
their claim to an award of just compensation and damages pursuant 
to constitutional and statutory rights. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
NT H. WALL & 
AN V. LITIZZETTE 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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